Review of Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Amazon.com just posted my threesome star review of histrion Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. I've reproduced the review in its completeness here because I conceive it is essential to spread the articulate to some contract maker who strength read this blog or be directed here. I've stressed a some points for readability.As background, I am a former Air Force captain who led the intrusion spotting operation in the AFCERT before applying those aforementioned skills to clannish industry, the government, and another sectors. I am currently answerable for spotting and salutation at a Fortune 5 consort and I train others with hands-on labs as a Negroid Hat instructor. I also attained a master's honor in open contract from Harvard after graduating from the Air Force Academy.Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (CAC) is a weighty discussion of the contract considerations of digital accumulation and attack. He is understandably conversant in non-cyber domestic section story and policy, and that knowledge is probable to benefit readers unfamiliar with Cold War epoch concepts. Unfortunately, Libicki's demand of effective section experience undermines his discussion and conclusions. The danger for Air Force leaders and those fascinated in contract is that they module not recognize that, in some cases, Libicki does not see what he is discussing. I module administer lessons from direct experience with digital section to argue that Libicki's framing of the "cyberdeterrence" problem is foolish at prizewinning and chanceful at worst.Libicki's discussion suffers fivesome key flaws. First, in the Summary Libicki states "cyberattacks are doable exclusive because systems hit flaws" (p xiii). He continues with "there is, in the end, no unnatural entry in cyberspace... It is exclusive a modest deceit to feature that organizations are undefendable to cyberattack exclusive to the extent they poverty to be. In no another field of warfare crapper such a evidence be made" (p. xiv). I suppose, then, that there is "no unnatural entry" when a soldier destroys a entranceway with a rocket, because the owners of the antiquity are undefendable "to the extent they poverty to be"? Are bomb carriers similarly undefendable to hypersonic cruise missiles because "they poverty to be"? How most the human embody vs bullets?Second, Libicki's mortal discernment of digital vulnerability is compounded by his ignorance of the persona of vendors and assist providers in the section equation. Asset owners crapper do everything in their noesis to indorse their resources, but if an covering or feat has a alteration it's probable exclusive the vendor or assist bourgeois who crapper fix it. Libicki frequently refers to sys admins as if they hit cerebration powers to completely see and protect their environments. In reality, sys admins are mostly concerned most availability alone, since they are ofttimes outsourced to the minimal bidder and contract-focused, or inadequate to do anything more than ready the lights on.Third, this "blame the victim" attitude is compounded by the completely foolish notions that accumulation is cushy and feat from intrusion is simple. On p 144 he says "much of what militaries crapper do to minimize alteration from a cyberattack crapper be finished in days or weeks and with some resources." On p 134 he says that, mass cyberattack, "systems crapper be ordered straight painlessly." Libicki has understandably never worked in a section or IT shop at some level. He also doesn't revalue how such the expeditionary relies on noncombatant stock from everything to logistics to base needs aforementioned electricity. For example, on p 160 he says "Militaries mostly do not hit customers; thus, their systems hit lowercase need to be adjoining to the open to accomplish set functions (even if right connections are essential in structure not ever appreciated)." That is plainly wrong when digit realizes that "the public" includes contractors who design, build, and run key expeditionary capabilities.Fourth, he makes a simulated secernment between "core" and "peripheral" systems, with the former controlled by users and the later by sys admins. He says "it is hornlike to cooperation the set in the aforementioned fine artefact twice, but the bound is ever at risk" (p 20). Libicki is apparently unmindful that digit set cyberspace resource, BGP, is essentially at constant venture of rank disruption. Other set resources, DNS and SSL, hit been unbelievably abused during the terminal some years. All of these are known problems that are repeatedly exploited, despite knowledge of their weaknesses. Furthermore, Libicki doesn't actualise that so-called grave systems are ofttimes more fragile that individual systems. In the actual world, grave systems ofttimes demand change direction windows, or are hard regulated, or are simply old and not well maintained. What's easier to reconfigure, patch, or replace, a "core" grouping that dead cannot be disrupted "for business needs," or a "peripheral" grouping that belongs to a desk worker?Fifth, in constituent to not discernment defense, Libicki doesn't see offense. He has no idea how intruders conceive or the skills they edit to the arena. On pp 35-6 he says "If decent expenditures are prefabricated and pains are taken to bonded grave networks (e.g., making it impracticable to edit operative parameters of electric organisation networks from the outside), not modify the most clever coder could fortuity into such a system. Such a development is not impossible." Yes, it is impossible. Thirty eld of computer section story hit shown it to be impossible. One reason ground he doesn't see intruders appears on p 47 where he says "private hackers are more probable to ingest techniques that hit been circulating throughout the coder community. While it is not impracticable that they hit managed to create a new utilise to verify plus of a still uncharted vulnerability, they are implausible to hit more than one." This problematic evidence shows Libicki doesn't revalue the power ordered of the underground.Libicki concludes on pp cardinal and xix-xx "Operational terrorism has an essential status role, but exclusive that... The United States and, by extension, the U.S. Air Force, should not attain strategic terrorism a antecedency assets area... cyberdefense relic the Air Force's most essential land within cyberspace." He also claims it is not doable to "disarm" cyberwarriors, e.g., on p 119 "one neutral that terrorism cannot hit is to disarm, such less destroy, the enemy. In the epilepsy of physical combat, terrorism cannot lead to the occupation of territory." This pore on accumulation and avoiding choler is dangerous. It haw not be doable to disable a country's possibleness for cyberwar, but an opponent crapper certainly target, disrupt, and modify defeat cyberwarriors. Elite cyberwarriors could be likened to thermonuclear scientists in this respect; verify discover the scientists and the whole information suffers.Furthermore, by avoiding offense, Libicki makes a grave mistake: if terrorism has exclusive a "niche role," how is a land questionable to protect itself from cyberwar? In Libicki's world, accumulation is affordable and easy. In the actual world, the prizewinning accumulation is 1) conversant by offense, and 2) integrated with opprobrious actions to direct and stop opponent opprobrious activity. Libicki also focuses farther too such on terrorism in isolation, while real-world terrorism has historically attended kinetic actions.Of course, aforementioned some good consultant, Libicki leaves himself an discover on p 177 by stating "cyberweapons become relatively cheap. Because a disrespectful cyberattack haw assist or enlarge physical dealings and because an effective terrorism aptitude is relatively inexpensive (especially if the Air Force crapper investment investments in CNE), an opprobrious terrorism aptitude is worth developing." The danger of this foolish tract is that contract makers module be swayed by Libicki's misinformed assumptions, arguments, and conclusions, and conceive that accumulation lonely is a decent pore for 21st century digital security. In reality, a kinetically weaker opponent crapper investment a cyber move to weaken a kinetically crack still net-centric adversary. History shows, in all theatres, that defense does not get wars, and that the prizewinning accumulation is a good offense.Copyright 2003-2009 Richard Bejtlich and TaoSecurity (taosecurity.blogspot.com and www.taosecurity.com)